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ABSTRACT
Experimental  evidence  suggests  that  people  make  time-inconsistent  choices  and  display
overconfidence about positive personal attributes. Do these features affect consumer behavior in the
market? To address this question we use a new panel data set from three US health clubs with
information on the contract choices and the day-to-day attendance decisions of 7,978 health club
members over three years. Members who choose a contract with a flat monthly fee of over $70 attend
on average 4.8 times per month. They pay a price per expected visit of more than $17, even though
a $10-per-visit fee is also available. On average, these users forgo savings of $700 during their
membership. We review many aspects of the consumer behavior, including the interval between last
attendance and contract termination, the survival probability, and the correlation between different
consumption choices. The empirical results are difficult to reconcile with the standard assumption
of time-consistent preferences and rational expectations. A model of time-inconsistent agents with
overconfidence about future patience explains the findings. The agents overestimate the future
attendance and delay contract cancellation whenever renewal is automatic. Salesman pressure and
overstimation of future efficiency are the leading alternative explanations.
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University of California, Berkeley
Department of Economics










“Saturday 31 December. New Year’s Resolutions. I WILL [...] go to the gym three
times a week not merely to buy sandwich.” (Fielding, 1999. Bridget Jones’ Diary:
AN o v e l )
A few months later: “Monday 28 April. [...] Gym visits 0, no. of gym visits so far
this year 1, cost of gym membership per year $370; cost of single gym visit $123
(v. bad economy).” (Fielding, 2001. Bridget Jones: The Edge of Reason)
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Experimental evidence calls into question the assumptions of time consistency (Kirby and Her-
rnstein, 1995; Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992; Thaler, 1981) and rational expectations about
own abilities (Larwood and Whittaker, 1977; Svenson, 1981). Given the importance of the
economic implications, it is crucial to know whether time inconsistency and overconﬁdence,
as displayed in laboratory settings, aﬀect consumer behavior in the market. Recent empirical
studies point to market evidence of time inconsistency in the ﬁelds of consumption (Angele-
tos et al., 2001), addiction (Gruber and Mullainathan, 2002), and job search (DellaVigna
and Paserman, 2000). Market evidence of overconﬁdence appears in takeovers and corporate
investment (Malmendier and Tate, 2002 and 2003).1
This paper contributes to the empirical evidence on time inconsistency and overconﬁdence
by analyzing a simple yet economically signiﬁcant decision, enrollment and attendance in a
health club. The simplicity and familiarity of the contractual choice allow us to address
alternative interpretations of the previous literature, such as limited cognitive abilities. We
employ a new panel data set from three US health clubs with 7,978 members over three years.
Unlike most data sets on consumption behavior, this data set documents both the purchase
of a commodity–enrollment in the health club and membership renewal–and the actual
consumption–health club attendance. We complement this data set with a survey of health
club members, a survey of health club companies, and a ﬁeld experiment.
A crucial feature of this data set is the presence of a menu of contractual options. Consumers
can choose between two ﬂat-rate contracts–a monthly contract and an annual contract–and
a pay-per-visit option for $10. The monthly contract is automatically renewed from month to
month until the consumer cancels. The annual contract, instead, expires after twelve months
and the consumer has to explicitly renew it. We exploit the variation in the per-usage pricing
and in the renewal procedures to identify features of consumer preferences and beliefs.
We establish nine stylized facts, summarized in Table 1. We ﬁrst take advantage of the
presence of both ﬂat-rate and pay-per-visit contracts in the menu of memberships. We show
that health club members who choose a monthly contract with a ﬂat fee of over $70 attend on
1Aiely and Wertenbroch (2002), Fang and Silverman (2001), and Gruber and Koszegi (2001) also present
ﬁeld evidence on time inconsistency.
1average 4.8 times per month in the ﬁrst six months. They pay a price per expected visit in
excess of $17, even though a $10-per-visit fee is also available. Only 20 percent of the users in
the monthly contract pay less than $10 per visit ex post (Stylized Fact 1). Comparable ﬁndings
hold for the ﬁrst year of the annual contract. Using a survey, we document that health club
users overestimate their future usage by more than 100% percent (Stylized Fact 2).
The next stylized facts relate to the contractual choice over time. Users with a monthly
contract accumulate an average gap of 2.29 full consecutive months between the last attendance
and contract termination, at a monetary cost of $185 (Stylized Fact 3). We compare the renewal
behavior under the monthly and annual contract. Under the monthly contract the initial
attendance is 9.5 percent lower (Stylized Fact 4), but the likelihood of still being enrolled after
one year is 12.5 percent higher (Stylized Fact 5). Surprisingly, the contract that allows more
freedom to cancel has a higher share of agents renewing the contract, even though long-term
enrollment is cheaper under the annual contact. This diﬀerence is particularly high for agents
with low attendance in the ﬁrst 12 months (Stylized Fact 6).
We also consider the dynamics of average attendance for agents initially enrolled in the
annual contract. Average monthly attendance in the ﬁrst year is 46 percent lower than the
attendance of those who re-enroll in the second year (Stylized Fact 8). The pattern is reversed
for users initially enrolled in the monthly contract. Average monthly attendance in the ﬁrst
s i xm o n t h si ss i g n i ﬁcantly higher than in any of the subsequent six-month periods (Stylized
Fact 7). Finally, users who pay a high price per attendance in the monthly contract display a
longer gap between last attendance and contract termination (Stylized Fact 9).
Stylized Facts 1 through 9 are hard to reconcile with a standard model of time-consistent
decision-makers with rational expectations. In Sections 3.3 and 4.3 we discuss a number of
potential explanations of these facts, including high transaction costs of payment per usage,
risk aversion, overestimation of net beneﬁts of attendance, and salesman techniques. While
each of these interpretations explains some of the stylized facts, none provides a unifying
explanation for the overall pattern of the evidence.
In Section 3.1 we present a model of partially naive time-inconsistent agents (Strotz, 1956;
Phelps and Pollak, 1968; Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999 and 2001) that organizes
all empirical ﬁndings. Agents with these features pay more than $10 per expected visit (Stylized
Fact 1) for two reasons: they purchase a commitment device that increases future attendance
and they overpay due to overestimation of future attendance. Naive, time-inconsistent agents
also display a status quo eﬀect (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988; Madrian and Shea, 2001)
and delay membership cancellation under the monthly contract (Stylized Fact 3). Since they
expect to be more patient in the near future, they delegate cancellation to later selves in the
(irrational) belief that these later selves will cancel (Akerlof, 1991; O’Donoghue and Rabin,
2001). The delay of cancellation does not occur under the annual contract, since the annual
contract expires automatically after 12 month. As a result, the share of agents enrolled after
212 months is higher under the monthly contract than under the annual contract (Stylized
Facts 5 and 6). Under the annual contract, selective exit of users with low attendance explains
the higher average attendance for stayers than for the initial group of members (Stylized
Fact 7). Under the monthly contract, delay of contract cancellation explains the decrease in
average attendance, as negative shocks accumulate (Stylized Fact 8). Finally, in the presence
of heterogeneity, naive individuals who pay a higher price per attendance also have a longer
cancellation gap (Stylized Fact 9).
We highlight two alternative explanations that capture most of the facts. First, consumers
may underestimate both the net costs of attendance and the cancellation costs. These con-
sumers are overconﬁdent about their future attendance and display a status-quo bias. This
model explains the stylized facts for the same reasons that the model of naive time-inconsistent
agents does. A diﬀerence is that this model predicts no demand for commitment devices. A
second explanation is salesman pressure. Salespeople at the health club may use social pres-
sure to induce agents to ﬁrst purchase ﬂat-rate contracts, and then remain enrolled even for
low levels of attendance. This explanation, however, does not address the survey evidence on
overestimation of future attendance (Stylized Fact 2).
This paper provides market evidence of systematic and large deviations of consumer be-
havior from the standard model. These deviations occur in a familiar market setting, the
choice between ﬂat-rate and payment per usage. In the health clubs of our sample, the average
non-subsidized user chooses the monthly contract, and by doing so forgoes savings of about
$700 per membership, out of a total amount of about $1,500 paid to the health club. The
results of this study are likely to generalize to the 32.8m Americans who exercise in one of
the 16,983 US health clubs. Therefore, both in terms of monetary magnitude and in terms of
population involved, the non-standard behavior has a signiﬁcant economic impact in the health
club industry. Our interpretation of this deviation relies on time inconsistency and naivet´ e.
While the systematic deviations from the standard model are the core result of the paper,
we would like to emphasize two other themes. First, despite deviations from the standard
models, health club users are responsive to standard economic forces. We ﬁnd strong evidence
that individuals learn over time, and that they switch toward the contract that is more ap-
propriate given their attendance. Average attendance among stayers in the annual contract is
substantially higher than in the ﬁrst year (Stylized Fact 7). In addition, the observed initial
sorting between the monthly and annual contract conforms to the standard predictions for
agents with heterogeneous attendance costs (Stylized Fact 4).
Second, while the paper focuses on the consumer side of the market, it has implications
for the industrial organization of ﬂat-rate pricing2 and of automatic renewal. We show that,
2The previous studies on ﬂat-rate and pay-per-visit pricing had focused almost exclusively on the telecom-
munication industry (Miravete, forthcoming).
3in contracts with automatic renewal, a small cancellation cost induces substantially higher
survival rates. Arguably, this ﬁnding can explain the frequency of contracts with automatic
renewal in other industries such as the newspaper, credit card, and mail order industry. In
DellaVigna and Malmendier (2002) we explore the general implications of time inconsistency
and naivet´ ef o rﬁrm pricing.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the main
features of the health club data set. In Section 3 we consider the contractual choice at enroll-
ment and in Section 4 we analyze the contractual choice over time. In both Sections, a simple
model introduces the Stylized Facts and the discussion of the interpretations. In Section 5 we
evaluate the size of the deviations from the standard model. Section 6 concludes.
2 Health club data set
Health club industry. As of January 2001, 16,983 clubs were operating in the US. The
industry revenues for the year 2000 totalled $11.6bn. The memberships in the same period
summed to 32.8m, up from 17.4m in 1987. Fifty-one percent of the users were members in
commercial health clubs, while thirty-four percent were members in non-proﬁt facilities. Only
the market leader Bally Total Fitness with $1,007m revenues and 4m members is publicly
traded. Few companies operate in more than 10 states. Ownership concentration is in the
10th percentile of US industries.
Data set. We collected a new panel data set from three health clubs located in New
England, which we label clubs 1, 2, and 3. The data set contains information on the contractual
choices and the day-to-day attendance of users that enrolled after April 1, 1997. The sample
period lasts until August 24, 2000 for club 1 and until March 13, 2001 for clubs 2 and 3.
The day-to-day record of usage is made available by the technology regulating the access to
these health clubs, described below. The panel of contractual choices comes from the billing
records. Each entry in the accounting data speciﬁes the price paid for the transaction and a
4-letter code. This code allows us to track the membership type–standard, student, family,
corporate–as well as details like the subsidizing company (if any).
Several companies located near the clubs subsidize their employees’ attendance. For these
corporate members, the health club receives part of the membership payments directly from
the ﬁrms, with the remainder being paid by the members. The health club informs the com-
panies periodically about the number of employees enrolled and their attendance. This creates
incentives for the health club to record attendances accurately or, possibly, to overrecord them.
Contractual menu. We conducted a survey of the 100 health clubs in the metropolitan
area of Boston to document the contract design in the industry.3 Health clubs oﬀer three
3For details on the survey, see DellaVigna and Malmendier (2002).
4options to attend. 85 clubs oﬀer a monthly contract. A monthly fee is automatically debited
each month to a credit card or bank account until the user cancels the membership. 90 clubs
oﬀer an annual contract that involves the payment of an annual fee. Both monthly and annual
contracts have an initiation fee and no fee per visit. Finally, 82 clubs oﬀer a pay-per-visit
option, often in the form of a 10-visit pass. Health clubs 1 and 2 in our sample oﬀer the three
types of contract with the following additional features.4
1. The monthly contract has a monthly fee ranging between $85 (standard level) and $85
(discounted level). Non-corporate users also pay an initiation fee ranging from $0 (in
promotional periods) to $150. Corporate users generally pay an out-of-pocket monthly
fee between $19 and $65, as a function of the subsidy paid by their company, and no
initiation fee. Cancellation can be done in person at the club or by sending a written
note.5 If cancellation takes place before the 10th of the month, no further fees are due,
and the users can attend until the end of the month. Members who cancel after the 10th
have to pay the fee for the next month and can attend until the end of the following
month.
2. The annual contract charges up-front 10 times the applicable monthly fee, for a standard
fee of $850. Users thus get a discount of 2 months out of 12 in exchange for a yearly
commitment. The initiation fee is the same as under the corresponding monthly contract.
At the end of the year, the contract expires and members who wish to stay enrolled have
to sign up again, either for an annual or for a monthly contract. In order to encourage
renewal, the club sends out a reminder card one month before the contract expires.
3. The pay-per-visit system oﬀers two options, either to pay $12 per visit or to purchase a 10-
visit pass for $100. Transaction costs for the 10-visit pass are small. Users provide basic
demographic information and receive a card for ten visits. Unfortunately, attendance is
not tracked for the pay-per-visit users.
Users of club 3 face the same menu of contracts with lower prices and slightly diﬀerent
services. The monthly fee ranges from $13 to $52, and the initiation fee is at most $50. The
annual fee in the annual contract equals 10 times the corresponding monthly fee. The pay-
per-visit options are a $10 fee per visit, and a $80 pass for 10 visits. Finally, the enrollment in
a monthly or an annual contract does not include the provision of towels.
Under these three membership types, users deposit their cards in a basket at the front desk
when they enter. While they are exercising, a health club employee swipes them (marks the
4Contracts for one to six months with automatic expiration are also available. We do not include them in our
analysis, since they are typically targeted towards occasional summer users. We also remove from the sample
free limited-time memberships that are occasionally given to employees of the subsidizing companies.
5Some users cancel by discontinuing the payments to the health club.
5visit for the 10-visit passes), and users pick them up when they exit. This method guarantees
a high recording precision even during peak hours. The three contracts give right to the
same services, i.e., a temporary locker, towels, and access to the equipment. Also, both the
monthly and the annual contract allow members to “freeze” (suspend) their membership for
three months per year6. Users with a monthly contract do not have to pay their monthly fee
during the freezing period. Annual members get additional usage time after the twelve months
of the original membership.
The cancellation policy of the monthly contract involves a monthly deadline for cancellation
(the 10th of the month). To ﬁnd out whether consumers are aware of the exact deadline, we
conducted a survey among health club users. Since it was not feasible to survey members of the
three clubs in our sample, we collected data from random consumers in a mall in California.
48 consumers who stated that they attended a health club completed a survey7. Out of these,
32 individuals indicated a monthly membership and were then asked by which day they have
to cancel ‘in order to avoid paying the next monthly fee.’ All but one stated that they did not
know the answer or reported “cancellation any time (30 days in advance).” A follow-up with
the health clubs revealed that for 20 out of 27 individuals (whom we could match to a health
club), the clubs indeed had a monthly deadline. Therefore, out of 20 individuals enrolled in
15 diﬀerent clubs with monthly deadlines, only one knew the relevant date. Building on this
evidence, we will assume that the typical individual is uncertain about the monthly deadline
for cancellation (see Section 4.1).
Sample construction. We match the information on attendance and on contract choice in
the three clubs to form a longitudinal data set with monthly observations, covering the period
from April 1997 to August 2000 (club 1) and to March 2001 (clubs 2 and 3). Our analysis
focuses on enrollment spells. A spell starts whenever an individual enrolls (or re-enrolls) in
the club and ends whenever the individual quits. We deﬁne spells to be censored if either
the enrollment is ongoing at the end of the sample period, or the individual switches to a
short-term contract or receives a promotional membership. Individuals have multiple spells if
they quit the club and re-enroll at some later date.
The initial sample includes 11,605 individuals. We drop individuals who were never enrolled
in either a monthly or an annual contract (2,978 individuals). We eliminate spells with serious
inconsistency in the billing data (132 spells). We also exclude users with a family membership
to avoid issues regarding the joint consumption of the services (295 spells). Finally, in order to
limit the sample to ﬁrst-time users of these clubs, we drop users who had a free or a seasonal
membership before they chose a monthly or an annual contract (293 individuals).
Enrollment spells. This leaves us with a sample of 7,978 individuals and 8,615 enrollment
spells. In the paper, we use the sample ‘First spell’, which includes only the ﬁrst enrollment
6Monthly users can also quit for up to three additional months without repaying the initiation fee.
7The Survey protocal is available in the working paper version in DellaVigna and Malmendier (2003).
6spell for each individual. As Row 1 of Table 2 shows, Club 1 has 19 percent more members
than club 2, and more than twice as many members as club 3. The percentage of completed
spells (above 60 percent) is similar across the clubs. Of the 7,978 individuals enrolled in any
club, 87 percent choose a monthly membership as their ﬁrst contract. Health club members
rarely change the type of contract they initially enroll in. We also use the sample ‘First spell
and no subsidy’, a restriction of the sample ‘First spell’ to unsubsidized memberships. We
consider a membership to be unsubsidized if, over the whole spell, the average out-of-pocket
fee exceeds $70 per month for enrollment in a monthly membership and $700 per year ($58
per month) for enrollment in an annual membership. This smaller sample includes 1,120 spells
(14.03 percent of the full sample).
Descriptive statistics. In clubs 1 and 2, the average amount spent per spell is about
$550, and the average fee per month ranges between $43 and $53. For corporate users, these
are the out-of-pocket payments and do not include the subsidies paid by the sponsoring ﬁrms.
In club 3 the amounts are substantially lower, since the contracts are cheaper. In the sample
‘First spell and no subsidy’ (Columns 7 and 8), these amounts are 20 to 60 percent higher.
The initiation fee averages $4 in the sample ‘First spell’ since 86 percent of users do not pay
it. In the ‘First spell’ sample, individuals with a monthly contract attend on average 4 times
per month, and individuals with an annual contract attend on average 4.3 times per month.
Attendance in club 1 (Column 1) is somewhat higher than in the other clubs. Freezing of a
contract is rare in all the clubs. The bottom part of Table 2 displays the available demographic
controls. Users are somewhat more likely to be male than female and are on average in the
early thirties. Corporate memberships account for 50 percent of the sample, while student
memberships account for only 2 percent. Additional information on the data set construction
is available in the Data Appendix.
3 Contract choice at enrollment
3.1 Model
In this Section we provide a simple model of contract choice for consumers attending a health
club. The contractual options mirror those oﬀered in the three clubs in the sample. The model
captures the standard case of time-consistent decision makers with rational expectations. The
framework also embeds alternative preference and belief speciﬁcations, such as time inconsis-
tency, overestimation of future beneﬁts, and high transaction costs. In this Section and in
Section 4.1 we highlight eight testable predictions for the standard model. For a more formal
presentation, see DellaVigna and Malmendier (2003).
Contractual menu. A contract speciﬁes a sign-up fee L0, a price per usage p0, and the
number of periods (days) T0 of contract duration. The ﬁrm oﬀers consumers a choice between
7ﬂat-fee contracts, characterized by p0 = 0, and pay-per-visit contracts, characterized by L0 =0 .
The fee p0 in pay-per-visit contracts incorporates the transaction costs. Flat-fee contracts are
either monthly (T0 =3 0d a y s )o rannual (T0 = 360 days). The timing is as follows. At time
0, the consumers choose between a ﬂat-rate (monthly or annual) and a pay-per-visit contract.
They pay the lump-sum fee L0 at t = 1 and have the option, at t =1 ,...,T0, to attend the
health club or to pursue their best alternative activity. If they attend at time t, they pay the
fee p0 at time t. At t = T0, the agents choose again between the diﬀerent contracts, with the
lump-sum fee L0 due at T0 +1 , and so on.
Payoﬀs of attendance. If the agents attend the health club at time t they incur an
immediate cost c at time t a n dr e a pb e n e ﬁts b>0a tt i m et + 1. If they do not attend, they
attain the payoﬀ from the best alternative activity, which we normalize to 0. We interpret c as
the eﬀort cost and b as the (expected) net present value of all the future beneﬁts from better
health and improved ﬁtness. We assume that the cost of attendance c is uncertain at sign-up,
with a distribution G.T h ev a l u eo fc is realized after sign-up and is constant thereafter.
Intertemporal preferences. The benchmark assumption is that agents have time-
consistent preferences with daily discount factor δ. We embed this assumption in a model that
allows for quasi-hyperbolic preferences (Phelps and Pollak 1968, Laibson 1997, O’Donoghue
and Rabin 1999). The discount function for time s, evaluated at period t, equals 1 for s = t
and βδs−t for s = t+1,t+2,...,with β = 1 in the baseline case and β<1i nt h ec a s eo ft i m e





We can interpret β as the parameter of short-run discounting and δ as the parameter of long-
run discounting. If β is smaller than 1, the individuals exhibit time-varying discounting. The
discount factor between the present period and the next period is βδ, while the discount factor
between any two periods in the future is simply δ. The diﬀerence between the short-run and
the long-run discount factors generates time inconsistency.
We also consider the case of consumers who overestimate their time consistency. Partially
naive time-inconsistent agents with parameters (β, ˆ β,δ) (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2001) expect
(erroneously) to have the discount function 1, ˆ βδ, ˆ βδ2,...with β<ˆ β ≤ 1 in all future periods.
The individuals thus anticipate that they will have quasi-hyperbolic preferences in the future,
but they overestimate the future parameter of short-run discounting. The diﬀerence between
the perceived and actual future short-run discount factor ˆ β − β reﬂects the overconﬁdence
(naivet´ e) about future self-control. If the consumers have rational expectations, ˆ β equals β.
Attendance decision. At enrollment (t = 0), the agents assign discounted net utility
βδt(δb − p − c)t oa t t e n d a n c ea tt i m et, and utility 0 to the best alternative activity. Thus,
they would like to attend in a future period t, upon learning c, if c ≤ δb− p.
8While time-consistent rational agents attend as often as they wish, time-inconsistent agents
attend less often. At the moment of deciding whether to attend, the discounted payoﬀ of
attendance is βδb − p − c. Therefore, at each t they attend only if c ≤ βδb − p, i.e., with
probability G(βδb−p). The smaller is β, the larger is the diﬀerence between desired and actual
attendance probability G(δb−p)−G(βδb−p) and the more serious is the time inconsistency.
Partially naive time-inconsistent individuals with β<ˆ β are not fully aware of their time
inconsistency. At time 0 they overestimate the probability with which they will attend in future
periods. They expect to attend if c ≤ ˆ βδb − p, i.e., with probability G(ˆ βδb− p). The larger
is the diﬀerence ˆ β − β, the larger is the overestimation of the future attendance probability
G(ˆ βδb− p) − G(βδb− p) ≥ 0.









(δb− p0 − c)dG(c)
#
. (2)
The agents pay a fee L0, independently of attendance, and attain utility βδt(δb− p0 − c)f r o m
attending at time t, with 1 ≤ t ≤ T0 (notice the ˆ β in the integral). Using expression (2) it is
easy to show that at t = 0 agents prefer a ﬂat-rate contract (T0,L,0) to a pay-per-visit contract















Whenever the net value per visit is high (c ≤ ˆ βδb − p), the consumers expect to attend
regardless of whether they have to pay a price p (in the pay-per-visit contract) or not (in the
ﬂat-rate contract). They are willing to pay min(δb−c,p)=p, the price of one visit under the
pay-per-visit scheme. Whenever the value of the visits is positive but lower (ˆ βδb−p ≤ c<ˆ βδb),
the users attend only if p = 0, i.e., under the ﬂat-rate contract. In this case they are willing
to pay up to the value of a visit under the ﬂat-rate contract, (δb−c). Finally, for low value of
visits (c>ˆ βδb), the users attend under neither contract, and the willingness to pay is zero.
Using (3) and inequality
R ˆ βδb
ˆ βδb−p(δb − c)dG(c) ≤
h




G(ˆ βδb) − G(ˆ βδb− p)
i
,
we prove the following Proposition.
Proposition 1. For agents that prefer a ﬂat-rate contract (T0,L,0) over a pay-per-visit
contract (T0,0,p),
(1 − δ)T0
1 − δT0 L ≤ p · T0G(βδb)
+(1 − ˆ β)δb· T0
h





G(ˆ βδb) − G(βδb)
i
.
9For the baseline case of agents with standard time-consistent preferences and rational ex-
pectations (β = ˆ β = 1), Proposition 1 implies the following testable prediction.
Prediction 1. (Price per expected attendance at enrollment) Agents who choose a
ﬂat-rate contract (T0,L,0) over the pay-per-visit contract (T0,0,p) attend frequently enough
such that
(1 − δ)T0
1 − δT0 L/T 0G(βδb) ≤ p (5)
Time-consistent agents are willing to pay at most p per expected attendance, the price of
the pay-per-visit contract. The adjustment term (1 − δ)T/
³
1 − δT0´
derives from the fact
that the fee L is paid up-front at t =1 ,w h i l et h ep r i c ep is paid between periods 1 and T0.
Time-inconsistent agents may instead pay more than p for two distinct reasons. To the
extent that they are sophisticated (ˆ β<1), they value the ﬂat-rate contract as a commitment
device to overcome the short-run impatience. The second term in (4) is the price that the
consumers are willing to pay for this commitment: (1 − ˆ β)δb is the additional utility of each
extra attendance on top of the utility for the future impatient self. This term multiplies the
expected increase in attendance T0[G(ˆ βδb) − G(ˆ βδb− p)] induced by the zero per-visit price.
Second, to the extent that the agents are naive about the future time preferences (β<ˆ β), they
overestimate the number of attendances. The additional willingness to pay (relative to time-
consistent agents), captured in the third term in (4), equals the overestimation of attendance
T0[G(ˆ βδb) − G(βδb)] times the willingness to pay for an attendance, p.
As a result, Prediction 1 does not need to hold for time-inconsistent agents, though it
may still hold if time inconsistency is limited (β close to 1). For instance, consumers may
overestimate their future attendance, but still attend often enough under the ﬂat-rate contract
to pay less than $10 per visit.
Since condition (5) is only a necessary condition for the standard model to hold, Prediction
1 provides a conservative test of the standard model of time-consistent agents with rational
expectations. Moreover, we are neglecting initiation fees and cancellation costs for the ﬂat-rate
contracts, which further biases the test in favor of the standard model.
A second, basic test for the standard model is whether consumers have rational expectations
about their attendance probability. Denote by ˆ G the distribution of costs that the agents
forecast as of time 0. Rational expectations implies ˆ G = G.





the average attendance G(βδb).
3.2 Empirical analysis
We test Prediction 1 using the sample of users enrolled in an unsubsidized ﬂat-rate membership
in clubs 1 and 2. We analyze separately users in club 3 given the lower fee per visit. We consider
10the 10-visit pass to be the empirical counterpart of the pay-per-visit contract, so p = $10.8
Monthly contract. For users initially enrolled in a monthly contract, we compute the
price per expected attendance for each month. We limit the analysis to the ﬁrst 6 months
of tenure to target inexperienced users. We use the sample ‘First spell and no subsidy’ (912
spells) to ensure comparability to standard health clubs with no corporate subsidy.
The ﬁrst Column in Table 3 reports the average monthly fees in months 1 through 6, with
standards errors in parentheses. The sample for month t consists of users who initially enrolled
in a monthly contract and have had a continuous history of membership under either a monthly
or an annual contract. Consumers who cancel or are censored drop out of the sample. For
users who switch to an annual contract, the monthly fee is the monthly share of the annual
fee. The average monthly fee exceeds $80 in all months, except in the joining month which is
typically pro-rated, and in month 3, a promotional free month for 18.6 percent of the sample.
The average number of visits for users in the tth month of tenure (Column 2) declines from
5.45 in month 2 to 4.32 in month 6 (where, again, month 1 covers only part of a month).
The third Column in Table 3 presents the ratio of the average fee in month t (Column
1) and the average attendance in month t (Column 2). This ratio is the estimated price per
expected attendance for month t. In each of the six months we reject the hypothesis that
the measure is smaller than $10. The estimate ranges between $14 and $16 in the ﬁrst three
months and is higher than $17 in the subsequent three months. As a summary measure, we
compute the ratio of average monthly payment (Column 1) and average monthly attendance
( C o l u m n2 )i nt h eﬁrst six months across all individuals.9 The resulting price per average
attendance in the ﬁrst six months of enrollment equals $17.13, well above $10.
In addition to averages, we consider also the distribution of these measures in the ﬁrst six
months (Table 4). We measure the price per attendance as the ratio of total attendance over
total payment in the ﬁrst six months of membership in a monthly contract. In this sample,
only 20 percent of the individuals pay less than $10 per visit. The remaining 80 percent would
have saved money choosing the pay-per-visit contract.
Annual contract. We also test Prediction 1 on the sample of users who chose an annual
contract at enrollment. We restrict the sample ‘First spell and no subsidy’ to users who joined
the club at least 14 month before the end of the sample period. This ensures that we observe
the annual contract in its entirety.10 The ﬁnal sample consists of 145 spells.
8The (hypothetical) average price per average attendance from using the 10-visit pass, given the distribution
of attendance for users enrolled with the monthly and the annual contract, is $10.86. The beneﬁts of a lower
price relative to the $12 per-visit fee outweigh the losses from unused coupons.
9For each individual, we compute the average over all available months until the sixth, with the exception
of miscoded months and months with freezing. When averaging across individuals, we weigh all individuals
equally, independent of tenure.
10We exclude 3 annual contracts that are terminated before the 12th month. Health clubs are required to
accept cancellations for medical reasons or for relocation more than 25 miles away from the clubs.
11The bottom row of Table 3 presents the estimation results. The sample average of the
monthly share of the annual fee for the ﬁrst year (Column 1), adjusted for discounting, is
$71.02.11 The average number of monthly visits in the ﬁrst year (Column 2) is 4.68. The
resulting price per average attendance (Column 3), $15.15, is somewhat lower than for the
monthly contract but still substantially higher than $10. The lower estimate is presumably
due to the selection of users with high expected attendance into the annual contract, and the
lower fee of the annual contract. Table 4 shows the distribution across users of attendance and
of the price per attendance in the ﬁrst year of an annual membership. Only 24 percent pays
less than $10 per visit.
Stylized fact 1. (Price per expected attendance at enrollment) Users who choose an
unsubsidized ﬂat-rate contract pay a price per average attendance of over $17 in the monthly
contract and over $15 in the annual contract. The share of users who pay ex post less than
$10 per visit is 20 percent in the monthly contract and 24 percent in the annual contract.
Robustness. Before we discuss possible explanations of Stylized Fact 1, we check its
robustness and address concerns about institutional frictions.
1. Sample. So far we have restricted attention to the unsubsidized sample and pooled the
results across clubs. We now consider subsidized users as well and disaggregate the results by
club. The sample includes users initially enrolled with a monthly contract in the sample ‘First
Spell’. Separately for each club, we regress health club attendance on the monthly fee using
an Epanechnikov kernel. The measure of attendance is the average attendance per month in
the ﬁrst 6 months. We cross-validate club-by-club with a grid search to compute the optimal
bandwidth for the price.12 Figure 1a shows the results for club 1. The average monthly
attendance from the kernel regression lies between 3 and 5 and is increasing in price, although
the estimates are not very smooth given the small bandwidth suggested by the cross-validation.
We use the average attendance from the kernel regression to compute the ratio of price and
average attendance for each level of price. Figure 1b plots the price per average attendance with
95 percent conﬁdence intervals. The price per average attendance is signiﬁcantly higher than
$10 for users paying a monthly fee in excess of $53. The estimates for club 2 are comparable
(Figures 1c and 1d) and somewhat smoother given the larger optimal bandwidth. In club 3
the price per average attendance is higher than the per-visit fee of $8 for users paying a fee in
excess of $46 (Figure 1f).
2. Underrecording of attendance. The high price per attendance could result from under-
recording of attendance due to a faulty computer system or moral hazard problems with the
staﬀ. Alternatively, health club employees may simply seek to avoid queues of users waiting to
swipe. While these phenomena may be observed in other health clubs, they are unlikely to oc-
cur at the three health clubs in our sample. These clubs put in place one of the most advanced





12Pagan and Ullah (1999), pp. 110—120.
12and reliable systems to track attendance in the industry, presumably in order to report atten-
dances to the subsidizing corporations.13 Unlike in most clubs, a front-desk employee collects
the cards from the members and swipes them in a quiet moment. Therefore, card swiping does
not generate queues. Nevertheless, to assess the importance of occasional computer lapses or
laziness of speciﬁc employees, we construct a test of accuracy of the attendance records. For
each day, we calculate the fraction of members attending and regress it on a set of controls:
6 day-of-the-week dummies, 11 month dummies, 3 year dummies, and 15 holiday dummies.
If recording of attendance is largely driven by random variation in computer crashes or staﬀ
dedication, the R2 of this regression should be low. The R2 of the regression for club 1 instead
is as high as .8785, with the day-of-the-week dummies explaining most of the variance. The
regression for clubs 2 and 3 yield an even higher R2 of .8915.14 The high explanatory power
of these regressions suggests that daily variation in recording precision is limited.
3. Additional beneﬁts. The monthly and annual contracts provide the same beneﬁts as
the pay-per-visit system except for the option to rent an overnight locker at an extra fee.15 If
users value this option highly, they may be willing to forgo the monetary savings of paying per
visit. However, only 5.52 percent of the users ever rent a locker. If we exclude these users, the
results on price per average attendance for the monthly contract do not vary.
4. Ex-post subsidies. Some HMOs reimburse members partially for health club expenses.
To the extent that these reimbursements make the annual and the monthly contract cheaper
relative to the pay-per-visit contract, they induce users to choose ﬂat-rate contracts. However,
a survey of the HMOs16 in the state where the three clubs operate shows that the discounts
apply either only to the initiation fee, or both to ﬂat-rate and pay-per-usage contracts.
Overall, we observe a robust deviation from the prediction of a model of time-consistent
agents with rational expectations. Non-subsidized users enrolled in contracts with ﬂat fees pay
a price per average attendance that is signiﬁcantly higher than the per-visit price available
as an alternative contract. The result is robust to the type of contract (monthly or annual),
the sample (the amount of subsidy), and the club considered. The results do not appear to
depend on measurement error, unobserved beneﬁts, or ex-post subsidies. The deviations from
the predictions for time-consistent agents are large in size: unsubsidized members of a monthly
contract pay 70 percent in excess of the $10 fee.
13In fact, we selected these clubs in part because of the data quality. A dozen of other clubs with which we
established preliminary contacts had software or hardware problems in the recording of attendance.
14Detailed results are available in DellaVigna and Malmendier (2003).
15In particular, a 10-visit card gives the same rights to get a towel and a temporary locker, hire a personal
trainer, take the (free) aerobic classes and attend other clubs of the same company.
16We report the results in Appendix Table 3 in DellaVigna and Malmendier (2003). We thank Nancy Beaulieu
for providing the list of HMOs.
133.3 Interpretation
The model in Section 3.1 suggests two possible explanations for this deviation based on time
inconsistency and naivet´ e. First, sophisticated time-inconsistent users (β = ˆ β<1) may
purchase the monthly contract as a commitment device to increase attendance. Under this
interpretation, the inequality (4) and the empirical results imply a lower bound for (1−β)δb·
[G(βδb) − G(βδb− p)]/G(βδb) of $17−$10 = $7. In turn, this implies (1−β)δb ≥ $7. Second,
users may be naive about their time inconsistency (β<ˆ β = 1). Inequality (4) then implies
that they overestimate the probability of attending the health club by at least seventy percent.
An average attendance of two visits a week, while far from the actual number of visits, is a
plausible estimate of the desired number of visits: the health club staﬀ encourages members
to attend two to three times per week.
We consider four alternative explanations within the framework of Subsection 3.1.
1. Transaction costs. Users may choose a ﬂat-rate contract even though they expect to
attend little if paying per visit entails large transaction costs. Formally, a per-visit transaction
cost k adds to the per-visit price p in equation (5). Stylized fact 1 is consistent with the
standard model for transaction costs of at least $7 per visit. The actual transaction costs,
however, appear to be small. Users can purchase a ten-visit pass by ﬁlling out a simple form,
and can then enter the club for ten visits with the same procedure as users with a monthly or
annual contract. A transaction-cost-based explanation requires a time cost of over $70 for the
few minutes necessary to ﬁll out the form. A high distaste for payment per visit (Loewenstein
and Prelec, 1998), however, could explain the ﬁndings.
2. Risk aversion. Assume a utility function that is additively separable in income and
health club net beneﬁts, u(L,p)+v(c,b). Users that are risk averse in income may prefer
a ﬂat-rate contract to the pay-per-visit contract because the former contract minimizes the
variance of the payments.17 This eﬀect, however, should be small for the monthly contract.
Over the small amounts of money required for a monthly contract, the agent is locally risk
neutral (Rabin, 2001). The price per average attendance, instead, is particularly high for users
in the monthly contract.
3. Overestimation of net beneﬁts. Users may choose ﬂat-rate contracts because they over-
estimate the future beneﬁts of attendance b or underestimate the expected future costs E[c],
possibly because of projection bias (Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin, 2002). This inter-
pretation, like the one based on naivet´ e about self-control, suggests that agents overestimate
future attendance due to non-rational expectations about an underlying parameter.
4. Salesman techniques. Given that users attend on average less than eight times per
17The result is not robust to the speciﬁcation of the utility function. Under the assumption that the utility
function is a concave function of the sum of income and health club net beneﬁts, the predictions are reversed:
more risk-averse agents are more likely to choose the pay-per-visit contract.
14month, ﬂat-rate contracts are more proﬁtable for the health clubs than pay-per-visit contracts.
Salespeople may pressure consumers to choose the monthly and annual contract. In the lan-
guage of the model, this translates in an increase of the eﬀective price p to reﬂect the psychic
cost of disobedience to the salesman. In order to investigate whether consumers receive enough
information about the pay-per-visit contract, we set up a small experiment. We provided sub-
jects with incentives similar to those of a median user of health clubs. Each of the subjects
had a budget of $90 and had to choose the cheaper option to attend a club under the assump-
tion that he/she would go on average four (three for some)18 times per month. The subjects
could keep whatever they saved out of the $90, in addition to a ﬁxed payment of $15. In
order to ensure no communication with other subjects, we met each subject individually and
at diﬀerent times. We instructed them to visit club 1 in person, and met them again indi-
vidually afterwards.19 Of the 11 subjects participating, 7 chose a pay-per-visit option (which
was the pay-maximizing choice), while 4 picked the monthly contract. While the majority of
subjects did not ﬁnd it diﬃcult to ﬁnd out about the pay-per-visit option, it appears that
some salespeople were reluctant to mention the pay-per-visit contract. As an alternative test,
we consider the contractual choices of members of a speciﬁc HMO who can choose between
a 20% discount on the ﬂat-rate contracts and a $6 payment per visit. Presumably, members
claiming this discount are aware of both options, since both are explicitly listed on the HMO
website. Nevertheless, the price per expected attendance over months 1 to 6 for HMO members
enrolling with a monthly contract equals $10.65 (s.e. 0.25), signiﬁcantly higher than the $6
price per visit.
While transaction costs and risk aversion are unlikely to explain our empirical ﬁndings,
psychological transaction costs, overestimation of net beneﬁts, and salesman techniques may
contribute to the explanation of Stylized Fact 1.
3.4 Survey results
We complement the results from the data set of health club consumers with survey data from
a sample of 48 randomly chosen health club users in California (details in Section 2). In
the survey, we elicit the expectations of respondents about their own attendance in the next
month, September.20 This question attempts to measure directly whether health club users
have rational expectations, as posited by the standard model and by the alternative models
of sophisticated time inconsistency, transactions costs, and salesmen techniques. Although
we do not observe actual attendance among these 48 survey respondents, it is unlikely to
18Interestingly, club 1 increased the price of a vist to $20 and the price of a 10-visit-pass to $150 after this
paper was written. To make the choices of subjects comparable to the choices in our sample, we lowered the
attendance to three visits per month.
19Instructions are available in DellaVigna and Malmendier (2003).
20In our sample attendance in September is ﬁve percent lower than the yearly average.
15diﬀer substantially from attendance in our data set, which is very robust across demographic
subgroups. Across 24 (gender)*(club)*(age) subgroups, the average monthly attendance over
the membership is lower than 4.75 visits for 23 out of 24 groups, with an overall average of
4.17 monthly visits. We establish the following stylized fact.
Stylized Fact 2 (Forecasts of attendance). The average forecasted number of monthly
visits, 9.50 (s.e. 0.66), is more than twice as large as average attendance, 4.17.
The overestimation displayed by the subjects matches with Stylized Fact 1. If health club
consumers expected to attend 9 times per month, they should indeed choose a ﬂat-rate contract,
rather than paying per visit.
We also present the subjects with the following scenario: ‘Suppose that, based on your
previous experience you expect to attend on average 5 times per month (about once a week), if
you enroll in a monthly membership. You plan to attend the health club throughout the next
year. Would you choose a monthly contract with a monthly fee of $70 per month or 10-visit
passes for $100 (each visit costs $10)?’ This question attempts to measure whether users en-
dowed with rational expectations about attendance would still overwhelmingly choose ﬂat-rate
contracts. In the hypothetical scenario, 18 consumers out of 48 prefer the monthly contract,
and 30 prefer the 10-visit pass. With realistic expectations about attendance, therefore, the
majority of people prefers to pay per visit.
These two ﬁndings support the explanations of the results based on irrational expectations
about self-control (ˆ β>β )o ra b o u tt h en e tb e n e ﬁts of attendance ( ˆ G left-shift of G). However,
one should take responses to hypothetical questions with caution, particularly because the
survey sample diﬀers from the health club sample.
4 Contract choice over time
4.1 Model
In the previous Section, we have used the diﬀerences between ﬂat-rate and pay-per-visit con-
tracts to draw inferences about consumer preferences and expectations. In this Section, we
take advantage of two diﬀerences in the renewal procedure between the ﬂat-rate contracts.
First, the renewal default diﬀers. The monthly contract is automatically renewed and requires
as m a l le ﬀort–sending a letter, cancelling in person–in order to discontinue the membership.
The annual contract automatically expires after 12 months, and cancellation requires no ef-
fort. Second, members of the monthly contract can cancel at any month, while members of
the annual contract are committed for a year. We consider the direct implications of these
contractual diﬀerences as well as the indirect implications for sorting between the two con-
tracts. We evaluate the impact of these diﬀerences on cancellation lag, survival probabilities,
and average attendance over time under the standard model and for the alternative models
16presented in Sections 3.1 and 3.3.
Calibration. Consider two agents with identical preferences and cost realizations c.O n e
has enrolled in the monthly contract, the other in the annual contract. At the end of the
contractual period, each consumer can either renew with a monthly or annual contract, or
switch to payment per visit (which is equivalent to dropping out). Denote with s the daily
savings from switching to the pay-per-visit contract. Assume cancellation costs kM = $15
for the monthly contract and kA = $0 for the annual contract, and a daily discount factor δ
of .9998 (corresponding to a yearly discount factor of .93). A rational time-consistent agent
switches to payment per visit if the transaction costs are smaller than the future discounted
gains from switching, i.e., if k<δ s / (1 − δ)o rs>k(1 − δ)/δ. For the calibrated values, the
right-hand side equals approximately .3 cents under the monthly contract and 0 under the
annual contract. Therefore, under either of the two contracts, a rational time-consistent agent
switches at the next renewal whenever the savings are positive.
A time-inconsistent agent enrolled under the annual contract switches immediately to the
pay-per-visit contract if the savings are positive (s>0), given that the cancellation costs kA
are zero. The positive cancellation costs kM of the monthly contract, instead, may induce a
delay in cancellation since each self would like to delegate cancellation to a later self. The size
of the delay depends on the sophistication of the agent.
A sophisticated time-inconsistent agent would like to delegate quitting to a later self, but
prefers immediate quitting if cancellation would otherwise be postponed for too long. Following
O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001), we obtain a bound on the delay in switching tC, tC / kM(1 −
βδtC)/βδs or, under a calibrated21 β of .7, if tC / 6.6/s. Thus, a sophisticated agent with
savings of 20 cents per day (s = .2) or $6 per month (one tenth of the average monthly fee)
is willing to delay cancellation by at most 33 days. An agent who loses more is even less
willing to delay. The cancellation costs for the monthly contract induce only a limited delay of
cancellation. The probability of cancellation, therefore, is similar for the monthly and annual
contract.
A naive time-inconsistent agent, instead, may delay switching forever in presence of the
small cancellation costs kM of the monthly contract. She believes that her future selves will
be exponential. She thus incorrectly expects to switch in T periods if kM <δ s / (1 − δ). If
this inequality holds, the agent postpones switching for T periods if kM ≥ βδTkM + βδs(1 −
δT)/(1−δ), or, using the approximation
¡
1 − δT¢
/(1 − δ) ≈ T,if kM ' βδTs/(1−βδT). Once
the T periods are over, however, the agent goes through the same reasoning, and postpones the
decision for T m o r ep e r i o d s ,a n ds oo ne v e r yT periods. If the agent believes that she can cancel
21Angeletos et al. (2001) and Paserman (2001) calibrate the hyperbolic model on ﬁeld data and ﬁnd values
of β between .5a n d.9. The results of the calibrations are similar for the ranges k ∈ [$5,$20],δ
365 ∈ [.90,.98],
β ∈ [.5,.9].
17on any day22,t h a ti s ,f o rT =1 , she delays cancellation forever is s / k(1 − βδT)/βδT ≈ $6.6
or, equivalently, for monthly gains up to $192. Diﬀerently from time-consistent and time-
inconsistent sophisticated agents, naive agents thus may delay cancellation forever under the
monthly contract, but not under the annual contract (which has no switching cost).23
Of the alternative interpretations discussed in Sections 3.1 and 3.3, the ones based on
transaction cost and overestimation of net beneﬁts make similar predictions. Both forces make
the ﬂat-rate contracts more attractive relative to pay-per-visit contracts, and therefore lower
s. These models therefore predict low cancellation rates under both the monthly and the
annual contract, with no diﬀerence in cancellation rates between the two ﬂat-rate contracts.
Salesman pressure increases the renewal probability particularly for the monthly contract, in
which one of the cancellation procedures involves contacting a salesman; under the annual
contract, salesman pressure is likely to be less eﬀective since cancellation is automatic.
Cancellation lags. The calibration results imply several predictions about cancellation
behavior and contractual choice over time. A ﬁrst, testable implication of the rational bench-
mark model applies to monthly members with low attendance. These consumers are likely to
have high savings s from switching to payment per visit.
Prediction 3. (Cancellation lags) Non-attenders cancel the monthly contract immediately.
Sophisticated time-inconsistent consumers will accumulate only minimal delays. Prediction
3 does not apply for the other models, naivet´ e about self-control, high transaction costs of per-
visit payment, overestimation of net beneﬁts, or salesman techniques. In all of these cases,
we may observe consumers with low attendance that nevertheless do not cancel the monthly
contract.
Sorting. Consumers take the longer commitment of the annual contract into account when
choosing their initial contract. Consumers who anticipate a high chance of being low-attenders
in the future prefer the monthly contract. These users value highly the option to switch sooner
to payment per visit. Users who, instead, believe that they will be high-attenders prefer the
annual contract. These users value the reduced price of this membership and do not mind the
yearly commitment.
The users selected into the annual contract, therefore, are more likely to be frequent users.
Using attendance in the initial months (before the selective exit) as a measure of the likelihood
to be a frequent user, we obtain the following prediction, which applies to any of the models
in consideration.
22The case T = 1 corresponds to a uniform prior over the monthly deadline, as suggested by the survey
evidence presented in Section 2. If agents know the monthly deadline (T = 30), delay still occurs for substantial
values of the savings variable s, that is, if the monthly gain from switching is at most $6.6.
23O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001) show that partially naive agents are similar to fully naive agents in their
delaying behavior. We omit this case for brevity.
18Prediction 4. (Sorting) Average attendance in the initial months should be higher under
the annual than under the monthly contract.
Survival probability. The renewal behavior of monthly and annual users depends on
the net eﬀect of cancellation costs and sorting. We consider the contractual choice at a time
when both contracts are up for renewal, i.e., after 12 or 24 months. We deﬁne the survival
probability Sj,t as the share of consumers who initially enrolled in contract j (equal to Monthly
or Annual) and are still enrolled with any ﬂat-rate contract after t months, with t =1 2 ,24.
For example, SM,12 is the share of monthly members who has not switched to payment per
visit by month 12. Similarly, SA,12 is the share of annual members who, after one year, renews
with an annual or a monthly contract.
Sorting implies that the users selected into the annual contract are ex-post more likely to be
frequent users, and therefore more likely to renew with a ﬂat-rate contract. This increases SA,t
relative to SM,t. Cancellation costs for the monthly contract, instead, may act to increase SM,t
relative to SA,t. In the standard model with time-consistent agents with rational expectations,
the calibrations above suggest that the direct eﬀect of cancellation costs is very small. We
therefore expect the sorting eﬀect to dominate.
Prediction 5. (Survival probability) The survival probability after one and after two years
is higher for agents who initially chose the annual membership than for agents who initially
chose the monthly membership: SA,t >S M,t, for t = 12, 24.
We expect this prediction to hold for the cases of time inconsistency with sophistication,
transaction costs, risk aversion, or overestimation of net beneﬁts. Each of these modiﬁcations
makes renewal more likely under both contracts, but not diﬀerentially so under the monthly
contract.
We obtain a diﬀerent prediction for two classes of models, time inconsistency with naivet´ e
and models with salesman pressure. Small cancellation costs induce naive time inconsistent
agents to delay cancellation under the monthly, but not under the annual contract. If the
delay is strong enough to override sorting eﬀects, the survival probability should be higher for
the monthly contract: SA,t <S M,t for t =1 2 ,24. Similarly, salesman techniques may lead to
higher renewal under the monthly contract, since users can drop out of the annual contract
without facing an health club employee.
While so far we have considered the unconditional survival probabilities SA and SM, the
survival probabilities are functions of the realized cost type c. Although the cost type is
unobserved, we can proxy for it with the attendance in the months prior to the 12th month.24
We denote by Sj,t(v) the survival probability of contract j at time t conditional on attendance v.
24Formally, we assume that the distribution of past visits conditional on the costs c does not depend on the
contract chosen. This condition is likely to be satisﬁed, since the monthly and the annual contract have the
same (zero) per-visit price.
19We expect that survival Sj,t(v) should be increasing in past attendance under either contract.
For agents with standard preferences and beliefs, we also expect higher survival rates under
the annual than under the monthly contract for all levels of past attendance v (Figure 2a).
Users with ex-ante low expected cost sort into the annual contract. Therefore, given that v
is only a noisy proxy for the cost c, annual users are more likely to be low-cost types, and
therefore to renew, than monthly user with the same attendance v.
Prediction 6. (Survival probability as a function of attendance) The survival proba-
bility after one and after two years is higher for agents who initially chose the annual mem-
bership than for agents who initially chose the monthly membership at all levels of past visits
v: SA,t(v) >S M,t(v) for all v, t = 12, 24.
Prediction 6 should hold also for the case of time inconsistency with sophistication, trans-
action costs, risk aversion, or overestimation of net beneﬁts. For time-inconsistent agents
with naive expectations, instead, the reverse inequality may hold–SA,t(v) <S M,t(v) for all
v, t = 12, 24–given that the agents may delay cancellation forever under the monthly con-
tract (Figure 2b.) Salesmen techniques may also induce a higher survival under the monthly
contract for all levels of attendance v.
Finally, we can consider a setting where a fraction of the agents is naive and a fraction
is not (Figure 2c). The survival probability for the heterogeneous population is a convex
combination of the survival probabilities for agents with rational expectations (Figure 2a)
and for naive agents (Figure 2b). If the proportion of naives is suﬃciently large, we expect
SM,t(v) ≥ SA,t(v) at least for low levels of attendance v. At these levels, the delay eﬀect is
stronger since more users have high costs of attendance and intend to quit. At high levels of
attendance, few agents want to switch to the pay-per-visit contract and the sorting eﬀect is
likely to dominate.
Attendance over time. As time goes by, users learn about the eﬀort of commuting to the
club and the enjoyment of exercising. Only users who ex post attend frequently enough renew
with a ﬂat-rate contract. Learning therefore induces selective exit of individuals with ex-post
low attendance patterns. Deﬁne as stayers individuals initially enrolled in an annual contract
w h od on o ts w i t c ht oap a y - p e r - v i s i tc o n t r a c ta f t e rt h eﬁrst year. Attendance for stayers in the
second year should be higher than for the initial group of annual members in the ﬁrst year,
since the low-attenders have switched to paying per visit.25 All the models considered above
yield the following prediction.
Prediction 7. (Expected attendance over time for annual contract) Among users
initially enrolled in an annual contract, the expected attendance in the second year among
stayers is higher than the expected attendance in the ﬁrst year for the initial group.
The standard model makes a parallel prediction for the monthly contract. As low-attenders
25The pattern of average attendance within each year, instead, depends on the type of shocks.
20quit, the average attendance for stayers increases from month to month, since users are allowed
to quit in any month.
Prediction 8. (Expected attendance over time for monthly contract) Among users
initially enrolled in a monthly contract, the expected attendance among stayers should increase
f r o mm o n t ht om o n t h .
The alternative models presented above all make this prediction, except for the model
of naive agents and for salesman pressure. Naive agents delay cancellation in the monthly
contract, even if they intend to quit. Since there is no selective exit, expected attendance
among stayers need not increase over time. In fact, if negative shocks are more common than
positive shocks26, average attendance decreases over time. Similar conclusions follow if agents
do not cancel because of salesmen pressuring them to renew.
4.2 Empirical Analysis
Cancellation lags. To test Prediction 3, we adopt, as a conservative measure of cancellation
lag, the number of full months between the last attendance and contract termination for users
who hold a monthly contract at the time of termination. For example, if an agent attends the
last time on March 10 and cancels on April 5, we count the 51 days between last attendance
(March 10) and membership termination (April 30) as one full month. We restrict the sample
to users who paid no initiation fee.27
Stylized fact 3. (Cancellation lags) On average, 2.29 full months elapse between the
last attendance and contract termination for monthly members, with associated membership
payments of $185. This lag is at least 4 months for 20 percent of the users.
Even though the transaction costs of cancellation are likely lower than $20 (time cost of
sending a letter or visiting the club), users spend on average $185 in membership fees after
their last attendance.
Sorting. To test Prediction 4 on sorting, we compare the average number of visits in
months 2, 3 and 4 of tenure for individuals initially enrolled in the monthly and in the annual
contract.28 Given that the price per visit p is zero for both contracts, diﬀerences in attendance
should reﬂect diﬀerences in the expected attendance cost. Column 1 of Table 5 reports the
results for the sample ‘First Spell.’ In each month, expected attendance is higher under the
26This is the case if the process for the cost of attendance is mean reverting. The agents select into the
ﬂat-rate contract when they have a very low realization of costs which then reverts to the mean.
27We include users with an unsubsidized membership (monthly fee higher than $70 or annual fee higher than
$700) who joined the club before the month of April 1998.
28We exclude the ﬁrst month because attendance is pro-rated over the number of eﬀective days of membership,
and the pro-rating procedure is slightly diﬀe r e n tf o rt h ea n n u a la n dt h em o n t h l yc o n t r a c t .W ed on o te x t e n d
the comparison to months after the fourth since users who experience a high cost can quit under the monthly
contract but not under the annual contract.
21annual than under the monthly contract, and signiﬁcantly so in months 3 and 4. Overall,
average attendance in months 2 to 4 is 9.5 percent higher under the annual contract. The
magnitude of this diﬀerence is comparable to variation in average attendance by age groups
and by gender. When we break down the sample into 24 age-gender-month cells, average
attendance is higher under the annual contract in 20 cells out of 24. Even after controlling
for some heterogeneity, individuals with lower cost of attendance are more likely to choose the
annual contract at enrollment.
Stylized fact 4. (Sorting) Average attendance in months 2-4 is 9.5 percent higher under
the annual contract than under the monthly contract.
Survival probability. We construct the survival measure si as follows. For spells starting
with an annual contract, the survival of member i, si, equals 1 if no more than one calendar
month elapses between the expiration of the ﬁrst annual contract29 and the enrollment of a new
monthly or annual contract; si equals 0 otherwise. For spells starting with a monthly contract,
no equally natural deﬁnition is available. We err on the side of overstating cancellation in the
monthly contract and set si to 1 if the individual is enrolled on the 14th month of active, paid
membership, and 0 otherwise.30 We assume the following simple empirical speciﬁcation to test
Predictions 4 and 5:
si =1i fs∗
i = α + γMi + ΦVi + Π(Vi ∗ Mi)+BXi + εi ≥ 0, (6)
where εi is normally distributed and Mi is a dummy variably that equals 1 if the ﬁrst contract




i ] is a quartic in the average monthly attendance over all the available months until
the 13th active month. Finally, the vector of controls X includes gender, a quadratic function
of age, a dummy for corporate membership, a dummy for student membership, 11 dummies for
the month and 4 dummies for the year of enrollment. We use the sample ‘First spell’ restricted
to users who joined the club at least 14 active months before the end of the sample period.
We also drop users with missing values of a contro lv a r i a b l e ,a sw e l la ss p e l l st h a ta r ec e n s o r e d
before the 14th active month.
Average survival probability. First, we constrain the coeﬃcients Φ and Π to be zero.
Within this speciﬁcation, the coeﬃcient γ captures the average diﬀerence in survival probability
between users initially enrolled in a monthly contract and users initially enrolled in an annual
contract. The coeﬃcients in Table 6 are the marginal change in a coeﬃcient in response to
an inﬁnitesimal change in the continuous independent variables, and a discrete change for
the independent dummy variables. In the speciﬁcation without controls (Column 1), ˆ γ is
29In 11.5 percent of the cases, the ﬁrst annual contracts lasts more than 12 months due to promotional months
and freezing periods.
30We exclude from the count of active months promotional periods, months in which the contract was frozen,
and months (up to 3 in a row) in which the agent has temporarily quit the club.
22positive. Enrollment in a monthly contract increases survival by 3.18 percentage point relative
to the baseline rate of 39.93 percent survival with the annual contract. The introduction of
demographic controls increases the coeﬃcient ˆ γ from .0318 to .0509 (Column 2) and to .0514
(Column 3) with dummies for the time of enrollment. Controlling for some of the unobserved
heterogeneity reduces the downward bias on the coeﬃcient due to sorting and makes the
coeﬃcient signiﬁcantly positive. For example, individuals enrolled with a monthly contract
are signiﬁcantly younger than users with an annual contract (Table 2), and young people are
less likely to renew (Columns 2 and 3 of Table 6). Failing to control for age biases downward
the coeﬃcient ˆ γ.
Stylized fact 5 (Survival probability). The survival probability after 13 months for the
monthly contract is 12.5 percent higher than for the annual contract.
Survival probability as a function of attendance. In Columns 4-5 we allow for a
linear eﬀect of past attendance v31. The parameter γ now captures the diﬀerence in survival
probability between monthly and annual contract for low past attendance, i.e., for v =0 . The
estimated ˆ γ is positive and very large, equal to .1650 without demographic controls (Column 4)
and equal to .1803 with controls (Column 5). For this second speciﬁcation, automatic renewal
doubles the survival probability for low levels of attendance from the baseline level of 16.79
percentage points for the annual contract to 34.82 for the monthly contract. The coeﬃcient
on v indicates that one additional visit per month is associated with a 6.56 percentage points
higher survival probability for users enrolled in an annual contract. The responsiveness of the
survival probability to attendance for users under the monthly contract is about half the size.
Figure 2d plots the predicted survival probability for the more general speciﬁcation with
a quartic polynomial in past attendance (Column 6). For low levels of past attendance the
monthly contract has a substantially higher survival probability. For higher levels of atten-
dance, instead, the annual contract has a higher survival.
Stylized fact 6 (Survival probability as a function of attendance). For low levels of
past attendance, the survival probability under the monthly contract is twice as high as under
the annual contract. For high past attendance, the annual contract has a higher survival.
Robustness. In Table 7 we check the robustness of the ﬁndings. First, we replicate
the results of Columns 4 and 5 of Table 6 using, as a proxy for attendance costs, the average
monthly attendance in months 9 to 12, if available, or else in the last 4 months of membership32.
The estimates are essentially unchanged. Second, we use the probability of enrollment in a
monthly or annual contract at the 15th and at the 16th month after the joining date as
alternative measures of survival.33 With demographic controls, users initially enrolled in the
31We check that past attendance predicts future attendance on the ﬁrst year of tenure for users in an annual
contract, for whom selective exit is not an issue. A regression of attendance in the 12th month on attendance
on each of the ﬁrst 6 months gives an R
2 of .4024.
32For users with spells shorter than four months, we use the attendance data for all the available months.
33Measures of survival at earlier months are inappropriate. First, given the pro-rating of the ﬁrst and last
23monthly contract are 7.19 percentage points more likely to be enrolled at the 15th month
(Column 4), and 5.82 percentage points more likely to be enrolled at the 16th month (Column
6) than users initially enrolled under the annual contract. Alternatively, we measure the
survival after two years as the probability of enrollment at the 27th and 28th month after the
joining date (Columns 7 through 10). In the speciﬁcations with controls, the estimate of γ is
positive, although not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0.
Third, we replicate the results of Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 for the sample ‘First spell and
no subsidy’ (Columns 11 and 12) and for the larger sample ‘First spell’ restricted to users who
pay at least $60 per month in the monthly contract or $600 per year in the annual contract
(Columns 13 and 14).34 In the ﬁrst, smaller sample the estimated ˆ γ has a similar magnitude as
in the benchmark speciﬁcation, but the estimates are imprecise. In the second, wider sample,
the coeﬃcient ˆ γ is positive and very large (.0925 with controls), as well as precisely estimated.
Overall, the results on survival probability are robust to the measure of past attendance, the
measure of survival, and the sample.
Attendance over time. Finally, we test Predictions 7 and 8 on the dynamics of average
attendance. We ﬁrst consider spells starting with an annual contract in the sample ‘First spell
and no subsidy’ and lasting at least two years.35 We display the results in Columns 1 to 3 of
the bottom part of Table 8.
Stylized fact 7 (Average attendance over time in annual contract). In the annual
contract, average monthly attendance in the ﬁrst year for the initial group, 4.69, is signiﬁcantly
lower than in the second year for stayers, 6.85.
The diﬀerence in attendance between the two groups is large: the baseline group in the ﬁrst
year attends on average 46 percent less than the stayers. Consequently, the price per average
attendance in the ﬁrst year, $15.15, is signiﬁcantly higher than in the second year, $10.77. The
results for the larger sample ‘First spell’ are comparable (Columns 4 to 6 of Table 8).
Figure 3a shows the within-year dynamics of the price per average attendance. The sample
at month t is given by the users in ‘First spell and no subsidy’ who have joined with an annual
membership and are still enrolled with a ﬂat-rate contract after t months of tenure. Over the
ﬁrst 12 months the price per average attendance increases from 12.5 to 18, as negative shocks
accumulate. At renewal (months 12 and 13), the price per attendance is halved.
For spells starting with a monthly contract, the sample for average attendance at month t is
given by the users in ‘First spell and no subsidy’ who have joined with a monthly membership
month of an annual contract, an annual contract always extends until at least the 13th month. Second, about
10 percent of the annual spells lasts until the 14th month due to a free promotional month.
34In both cases, we drop individuals who have missing values for a control or who joined the club later than
14 active months before the end of the sample period.
35The results remain unchanged if we restrict the sample further to users who renew with an annual contract
after 12 months.
24and are still enrolled with a ﬂat-rate contract after t months of tenure. Columns 1 to 3 of the
top part of Table 8 show the results by six-month groups.
Stylized fact 8 (Average attendance over time in monthly contract). Average monthly
attendance in the ﬁrst six months of a monthly contract, 4.85, is 26 percent higher than in the
next six months and is signiﬁcantly higher than in any of the later six-month periods among
stayers.
The price per average attendance for the ﬁrst six months, $17.13, is signiﬁcantly lower than
in any of the later six-month periods.36 As Figure 3b shows, the price per average attendance
increases over the ﬁrst 10 months from about $15 to about $20, and remains constant thereafter.
The results extend to the monthly spells in t h es a m p l e‘ F i r s ts p e l l ’( C o l u m n s4t o6 ) .
4.3 Interpretations
Stylized Facts 4 and 7 conﬁrm that standard economic forces such as sorting and learning are
at work in the sample. Consumers sort into the monthly and annual contract based on the
heterogeneous distribution of costs and beneﬁts of attendance (Stylized Fact 4). Moreover,
consumers that learn that they are low-attenders switch out of the annual contract, lowering
the average attendance over time (Stylized Fact 7).
Stylized Facts 3, 5, 6, and 8, however, are hard to reconcile with the predictions of the
standard theory. Unsubsidized monthly members spends on average $185 for periods with no
attendance before cancellation (Stylized Fact 3), despite small cancellation cost. In addition,
after one year, more individuals are enrolled in the monthly contract, which allows more
freedom to cancel, than in the annual contract (Stylized Fact 5). This result does not seem
to arise because of sorting but despite sorting. The result is economically and statistically
signiﬁcant, robust across speciﬁcations, and highest for users with low attendance (Stylized
Fact 6). Average attendance decreases by 26 percent between the ﬁrst six months and the next
six months in the monthly contract (Stylized Fact 8), a pattern contrary to the predictions of
learning, and opposite to the one found for annual contracts (Stylized Fact 7).
A model of naive time-inconsistent consumers can explain these stylized facts. The com-
bination of time inconsistency and naivet´ e generates a status-quo bias. Naive consumers are
substantially more likely to renew if renewal is automatic than if renewal requires a minimal
eﬀort. Therefore, survival probability is higher under the monthly contract, which is auto-
matically renewed, than under the annual contract (Stylized Facts 3, 5, and 6). Delay of
cancellation by low-attendance users can also explain why average attendance increases over
time in the monthly contract, but not in the monthly contract (Stylized Facts 7 and 8).
Most of the alternative theories discussed in Sections 4.1 and 3.3 do not appear to explain all
36The results remain unchanged if we restrict the sample further to users who have had a monthly contract
at all times until month t.
25of these facts. Models of sophisticated time-inconsistent agents, including other rational models
of self-control such as the temptation model by Gul and Pesendorfer (2001), are unlikely to
generate the patterns observed in the data, as the calibrations in Section 4.1 illustrate. Models
of high transaction costs can explain Stylized Fact 3 on cancellation lags, but not Stylized Facts
5, 6, and 8. Agents that dislike paying per visit should be more likely to renew both monthly
and annual contract. For these same reasons, the data does not support the hypothesis that
agents renew the membership because they would regard cancellation as a personal failure
(Gourville and Soman, 1998). This story also implies that users may switch from the monthly
to the annual contract to signal a strong commitment to themselves. This switch instead
happens for only 1.5 percent of the 7,079 spells initiated with a monthly contract.
A model with overestimation of future net beneﬁts can explain the substantial cancellation
lag of Stylized Fact 3. Once again, however, this hypothesis does not easily explain Stylized
Facts 5, 6, and 8 on higher survival for the monthly than for the annual contract. An over-
estimation story that can explain all the stylized facts requires that in addition consumers
underestimate the future costs of cancellation (i.e., overestimate future eﬃciency). With this
additional assumption, the overestimation model mirrors the model of time-inconsistency and
naivet´ e. An advantage of the latter model is that it is a fully speciﬁed model that makes
predictions about when the agents will underestimate and when they will overestimate. A
second diﬀerence is that partially naive individuals look for commitment devices, while agents
that overestimate their eﬃciency do not. Arguably, the demand for personal trainers indicates
a demand for commitment.
An alternative model that can rationalize most of the facts is a version of the salesman
model. Health club employees may exert pressure on monthly members that show up at the
club intending to cancel, but are bound to be less eﬀective with annual members that let their
membership expire. This may explain Stylized Facts 3, 5, 6, and 8. However, if individuals
are aware of their vulnerability to social pressure, the share of annual memberships should be
higher than the observed 13 percent share (Table 2). In addition, this explanation does not
address the survey evidence of overestimation of future attendance (Stylized Fact 9).
4.4 Heterogeneity
While the model of naive time-inconsistent agents ﬁts well all qualitative features of the data,
some features of the data are suggestive of heterogeneity in the population. In particular,
t h ep a t t e r n si nF i g u r e2 dﬁt well a heterogeneous population with naive and standard agents
(Figure 2c). This type of heterogeneity predicts a positive correlation between diﬀerent cor-
relates of naivet´ e. Members with a long cancellation lag in the monthly contract should be
more likely to pay a high price per attendance in the period before the last attendance, since
naivet´ e induces both behaviors.
26We test this prediction for users enrolled in the monthly contract. As a measure of can-
cellation lags, we use the number of consecutive full months between the last attendance and
the expiration (as in Section 4.2). As a measure of price per attendance, we take the ratio
of the payments to the health club over the attendance for the period between sign-up and n
months before the last attendance, with n equal to 1, 2, 3 and 4. We limit the time frame in
order to avoid a spurious correlation between the price per attendance and months of delay
due to low attendance in the ﬁnal months. Finally, we take the log of 1 plus the measures
in order to reduce the skewness of both variables. The correlation between the delay and the
price per attendance is positive and signiﬁcant, with values between .213 (n = 1) and .204
(n =4 ) . Longer lags n between the two measures do not aﬀect the estimate, suggesting that
the correlation is not likely to be spurious.
Stylized fact 9 (Correlations). Users who pay a high price per attendance in the monthly
contract display a longer gap between last attendance and contract termination.
Similarly, we predict that individuals who accumulate a long delay in cancellation should
be less likely to freeze a contract if they face a temporary period of non-attendance. We ﬁnd a
highly signiﬁcant negative correlation of -.1035 between a freezing proxy37 and the cancellation
delay. These results are consistent with the idea that time inconsistency and naive expectations
drive both the results on the high price per attendance for ﬂat-rate memberships (Section 3.2)
and the results on renewal behavior (Section 4.2).
5S i z e o f e ﬀects
The behavior of the average health club user deviates systematically from the predictions of
the standard theory. We now provide a coarse measure of the monetary size of this deviation.
For monthly and annual memberships, we compute the diﬀerence between actual expenses
over the whole enrollment spell and imputed expenses for the same number of attendances
with 10-visit passes.38 A positive value of this ‘average loss’ measure indicates that the user
would have saved money purchasing 10-visit passes, and a negative value indicates that the
user would have lost money with these passes. We construct the average loss measure for the
sample ‘First spell and no subsidy.’ To reduce the likelihood of censoring, we consider only
spells that start before October 1997.
The average loss per spell (Column 1 of Table 9) is $698 for agents initially enrolled in a
37The raw measure of freezing is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the individual ever froze before the last
attendance. To correct for periods of non-attendance, we run a probit of this dummy on the longest consecutive
number of months with no attendance before the last attendance, and the number of periods longer than 2
months with no attendance. The residual of this regression is the ﬁnal measure of freezing.
38We neglect the fact that attendance would be lower under a pay-per-visit contract than under a ﬂat-rate
contract. For time-consistent agents, the measure we adopt understates the savings from paying per visit; for
time-inconsistent agents, it may overstate the savings.
27monthly contract. This amount corresponds to 47.87 percent of the $1,517 spent on the health
club membership during the whole spell. For agents initially enrolled in an annual contract,
there is a small but insigniﬁcant gain of $61 (Column 4). Columns 2 to 3 and 5 to 6 present the
same variables for samples that include later spells. The estimates of the loss for the monthly
contract are somewhat lower, given the higher percentage of spells censored. The estimates of
loss for the annual contract are higher (a loss of about $200) but still imprecise.
Overall, the observed deviations from the standard model have large monetary consequences
for users in the monthly contract, for whom the automatic renewal ampliﬁes the eﬀects of the
initial overestimation of attendance. For users in the annual contract, the automatic expiration
moderates the possible losses from the initial overestimation.
6C o n c l u s i o n
Do consumers display time inconsistency and overconﬁdence in the market? In this paper we
have used a new panel data set from three US health clubs to provide an answer to these
questions. Members who choose a contract with a ﬂat monthly fee of over $70 attend on aver-
age 4.8 times per month. They pay a price per expected visit of more than $17, even though
a $10-per-visit fee is also available. On average, these users forego savings of $700 during
their membership. We present additional results on the interval between last attendance and
contract termination, the survival probability, the average attendance over time, and the cor-
relation between diﬀerent behaviors. These results are diﬃcult to reconcile with the standard
assumptions of time-consistent preferences and rational expectations. A model of agents with
time inconsistent preferences and overconﬁdence about self-control explains the ﬁndings. The
agents overestimate the future attendance and delay contract cancellation whenever renewal
is automatic. The leading alternative explanations are based on social pressure exerted by the
salesmen and overestimation of future eﬃciency.
The results in the paper have implications for the contract design by ﬁrms. Rational, proﬁt-
maximizing health clubs can easily learn the features of consumer behavior using data sets like
the one analyzed in this paper. We therefore expect them to oﬀer contracts that are designed
to maximize proﬁts given the features of consumers preferences and beliefs. In a related paper
(DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2002), we characterize the features of the proﬁt-maximizing con-
tract for goods that challenge the self-control of consumers with time-inconsistent preferences.
For goods with immediate costs and delayed beneﬁts–such as health club attendance–the
proﬁt-maximizing contract involves below marginal cost pricing of attendance and automatic
renewal with a cancellation cost. The typical contract of health clubs in the Boston area indeed
has these features. The evidence on contractual design conﬁrms the conclusions of the analysis
of consumer behavior.
28AD a t a A p p e n d i x
The data on consumer behavior come from the attendance panel and the billing records. A
7-digit identiﬁcation number allows us to link multiple spells of the same individual.
Attendance panel. Each time a user with a ﬂat-rate contract exercises, a staﬀ member
swipes the electronic card of the user, and therefore creates an attendance record. A line of
the attendance panel consists of the individual id, the date of the visit, basic demographic
information (birthday, gender), a code for short-term memberships, the enrollment and the
expiration date (for members that terminated the membership). All the information but the
date of the visits is constant for an individual.
Billing records. The health clubs keep an oﬃcial record of the customer payments. The
billing data provide detailed and accurate information about the category of users–retail (the
default), student, family, corporate–as well as the type of transaction. Each line of the billing
panel consists of the individual id, the date of the contractual transaction, the 4-digit code that
identiﬁes the transaction, and the price paid (if any). For example, line “1234567 1/1/98 R564
55” indicates that user 1234567 on Jan. 1, 1998 paid an out-of-pocket monthly fee of $55 that
applies to employees of company XYW. For the monthly contract, typical transactions are the
payment of the initiation fee, of the monthly fee, or of additional items such as an overnight
locker or a personal trainer. Other common codes involve monthly freezes of a membership,
bounced payments, and termination of a membership for delinquency in the payments. For the
annual contract, typical transactions are the payment of the initiation fee and of the annual
fee.
We use the price stated in the records as a measure of the monetary payments to the clubs.
We could alternatively use the 4-digit code and a conversion table (based on the prices as of
August 2000) to recover an imputed price. The correlation between the two measures of price
is .9668. None of the results changes if we use the imputed price instead of the actual price.
Monthly panel. We merge the attendance and the billing panel into a unique data
set, and we then transform the data into a balanced panel with monthly observations. Each
observation consists of a variable deﬁning the membership (not enrolled/enrolled in a monthly
contract/enrolled in an annual contract/in a freeze), the number of attendances in the month,
and the price paid for the month. For an annual contract, the monthly price is 1/12th of the
original price. In order to deal with monthly and annual contracts that start in the middle of
a month, we pro-rate the fees for the ﬁrst month. For the ﬁnal month of an annual contract,
we also pro-rate the fees. Monthly contracts always terminate on the last day of the month,
so no pro-rating is needed for the last month.
Enrollment spells. We deﬁne an enrollment spell as a continuous temporal sequence of
monthly or annual contracts, including possible freezes of the membership. If no more than one
calendar month of non-enrollment separates two contracts, we still include them in one spell.
For example, this is the case if an annual contract expiring on 15/1/98 is renewed on 17/3/98.
The missing monthly payment may be due to an (unrecorded) one-month promotional oﬀer, a
delay in payment, or missing data for a monthly payment.
We consider an enrollment spell censored if either the spell is ongoing at the end of the panel
or if the spell is followed by a short-term contract. One-month, two-month, three-month, and
four-month contracts with automatic expiration are available, mostly for summer users. We
do not analyze these relatively uncommon contracts, and therefore consider censored a spell
that is followed by one of these contracts. We also consider a spell censored if it is followed
by a sequence of months with no contract and attendance in at least half of the months. We
assume that in these periods health club members are using a free temporary membership,
which the clubs grant in various promotional or charitable initiatives.
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Figure 1. Average attendance and price per average attendance (Kernel regressions) 
 

























Average attendance in club 1
 
 































Price per average attendance in club 1
 
Figure 1a. Kernel regression of attendance on 
price (club 1, bandwidth 4). 
  Figure 1b. Price per average attendance as a function 
of the monthly price (club 1, bandwidth 4). 
    

























Average attendance in club 2
 
 































Price per average attendance in club 2
 
Figure 1c. Kernel regression of attendance on 
monthly price (club 2, bandwidth 16). 
  Figure 1d. Price per average attendance as a function 
of the monthly price (club 2, bandwidth 16). 
    

























Average attendance in club 3
 
 





























Price per average attendance in club 3
 
Figure 1e. Kernel regression of attendance on 
price (club 3, bandwidth 16) 
  Figure 1f. Price per average attendance as a function 
of the monthly price (club 3, bandwidth 16). 
 
 
Notes: Point estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals plotted. The sample is ‘First spell’ for individuals initially enrolled with a monthly contract. 
The individual price variable is the average price over the first six months. The individual attendance variable is the average attendance over the first six 
months. Figures 1a, 1c, and 1e show a kernel regression of attendance on price using an Epanechnikov kernel. The bandwidth is determined by cross-
validation with a grid search separately for each club. Figures 1b, 1d, and 1f show the ratio of the price and the expected attendance predicted for that 
price using the kernel regression. Confidence intervals are derived using the Delta method.   33




Figure 2.d. Predicted survival probability. 




















Notes: Figure 2d plots the predicted probability of membership at the 14
th active month after enrollment as a function of a quartic polynomial in 
past attendance. Figure 2d follows the probit specification of Column 6 in Table 6. 
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Notes: Point estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals plotted. Figure 3a plots the ratio of average price and average attendance at month n of 
tenure. The sample is ‘First spell and no subsidy, all clubs’ for individuals initially enrolled in the annual contract and still enrolled at month n of 
tenure. Figure 3b plots the ratio of average price and average attendance at month n of tenure. The sample is ‘First spell and no subsidy, all clubs’ 
for individuals initially enrolled in the monthly contract and still enrolled at month n of tenure. Standard errors for the ratio of average price and 
average attendance computed using the bivariate Delta method. 
Figure 3a. Price per average attendance





































Figure 3b. Price per average attendance
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Sophisticated  Partially naive Trans. costs of Overestimation Salesman 
Time-consistent time-inconsistent time-inconsistent payment of net benefits techniques
agents agents agents per usage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Stylized fact 1. commitment,
Price per average attendance > $10 commitment overestimation distaste of paym. overestimation pressure of
of attendance per usage of attendance salesman
Stylized fact 2.
Forecast of 9.5 monthly visits overestimation overestimation
compared to 4.2 actual monthly visits of attendance of attendance
Stylized fact 3.
Interval between last attendance delay in  distaste of paym. overestimation  pressure of
and termination 2.3 full months cancellation per usage of attendance salesman
Stylized fact 4.
Average attendance in first 4 months
higher in annual than monthly contract sorting sorting sorting sorting sorting sorting
Stylized fact 5.
Survival probability at 14th month delay in  pressure of
12.5 percent higher for monthly  cancellation salesman
than for annual contract
Stylized fact 6.
Survival probability at 14th month delay in  pressure of
double for monthly than for annual cancellation salesman
contract for low past attendance
Stylized fact 7.
Average attendance 46 percent higher learning learning learning learning learning learning
in second year for annual contract
Stylized fact 8.
Decreasing average attendance  delay in  pressure of
over time in monthly contract cancellation salesman
Stylized fact 9.
Positive correlation of price per  heterogeneity 
average attendance and interval  in naiveté
between last attendance and termination
Table 1: Stylized Facts and Explanations   36 
 
Club 1 Club 2 Club 3 All clubs
First First First First
All All All All Contract Contract Contract Contract
Contr. Contr. Contr. Contr. Monthly Annual Monthly Annual
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Number of spells
total 3548 2984 1446 7978 7079 899 912 208
completed spells 2440 1850 994 5284 4775 509 588 111
Total Amount in $ 569.05 548.97 312.24 515.00 501.28 622.97 920.51 1041.80
(509.94) (559.85) (307.50) (509.07) (513.41) (459.66) (713.68) (543.94)
N = 3548 N = 2984 N = 1446 N = 7978 N = 7079 N = 899 N = 912 N = 208
Initiation fee 6.32 1.99 2.85 4.07 3.87 5.62 14.46 17.07
(26.64) (12.16) (12.88) (20.13) (19.45) (24.82) (41.66) (45.15)
N = 3548 N = 2984 N = 1446 N = 7978 N = 7079 N = 899 N = 912 N = 208
Average fee per month
monthly contract 52.40 49.37 31.36 47.42 47.31 56.50 78.52 74.82
(18.34) (18.93) (10.91) (19.10) (19.05) (20.51) (5.07) (15.33)
N = 3185 N = 2663 N = 1314 N = 7162 N = 7079 N = 83 N = 912 N = 22
annual contract 48.33 43.76 24.15 42.83 45.94 42.48 69.89 66.26
(18.35) (17.34) (8.62) (17.50) (15.77) (17.66) (4.19) (4.21)
N = 445 N = 405 N = 151 N = 1001 N = 102 N = 899 N = 7 N = 208
Average attendance per month
monthly contract 4.06 4.02 3.75 3.99 3.98 4.62 3.96 5.45
(3.85) (3.82) (3.67) (3.81) (3.81) (3.79) (3.77) (4.15)
N = 3185 N = 2663 N = 1314 N = 7162 N = 7079 N = 83 N = 912 N = 22
annual contract 4.45 4.22 4.16 4.31 5.76 4.15 6.07 4.26
(3.90) (4.06) (3.98) (3.97) (4.20) (3.92) (4.04) (3.87)
N = 445 N = 405 N = 151 N = 1001 N = 102 N = 899 N = 7 N = 208
Contract choice per spell
months with monthly contract 9.18 8.91 8.86 9.02 10.11 0.44 11.70 0.55
(8.42) (9.14) (8.91) (8.78) (8.70) (2.12) (9.06) (2.35)
N = 3548 N = 2984 N = 1446 N = 7978 N = 7079 N = 899 N = 912 N = 208
months with annual contract 1.58 1.95 1.41 1.69 0.15 13.76 0.08 15.16
(4.75) (5.79) (4.84) (5.18) (1.52) (7.47) (1.08) (7.97)
N = 3548 N = 2984 N = 1446 N = 7978 N = 7079 N = 899 N = 912 N = 208
freezing 0.28 0.30 0.18 0.27 0.30 0.05 0.37 0.04
(0.97) (1.12) (0.73) (1.00) (1.05) (0.37) (1.22) (0.32)
N = 3548 N = 2984 N = 1446 N = 7978 N = 7079 N = 899 N = 912 N = 208
Female 0.44 0.49 0.47 0.46 0.48 0.34 0.38 0.35
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.47) (0.49) (0.48)
N = 3539 N = 2984 N = 1446 N = 7969 N = 7071 N = 898 N = 912 N = 208
Age at sign-up 30.71 31.54 35.05 31.81 31.52 34.04 33.14 34.40
(8.43) (8.94) (9.27) (8.92) (8.78) (9.65) (9.70) (10.78)
N = 3343 N = 2855 N = 1363 N = 7561 N = 6710 N = 851 N = 855 N = 197
Corporate member 0.43 0.61 0.43 0.50 0.50 0.53 0.16 0.16
(0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.37) (0.37)
N = 3548 N = 2984 N = 1446 N = 7978 N = 7079 N = 899 N = 912 N = 208
Student 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.22) (0.04) (0.06) (0.15) (0.15) (0.12) (0.06) (0.07)
N = 3548 N = 2984 N = 1446 N = 7978 N = 7079 N = 899 N = 912 N = 208
Notes: Standard deviation in parentheses. An enrollment spell starts whenever an individual enrolls (or re-enrolls) in the club and ends whenever the individual quits
or is censored. The sample “First spell” consists of the first enrollment spell. The sample “First spell and no subsidy” restricts the sample “First spell” to those spells
in which the average adjusted monthly fee is at least $70 if the spell starts with a monthly contract and at least $58 if the spell starts with an annual contract. The
spells in column “First Contract Monthly” start with a monthly contract. The spells in column “First Contract Annual” start with an annual contract. “Average price per
month” refers to the out-of-pocket fee in the case of corporate users.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Sample: First spell
All clubs All clubs
and no subsidy
Sample: First spell Sample: First spell
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Average price  Average attendance Average price
per month per month per average attendance
(1) (2) (3)
Month 1 55.09 3.45 15.98
(0.78) (0.13) (0.57)
N = 873 N = 873 N = 873
Month 2 80.53 5.45 14.78
(0.44) (0.18) (0.51)
N = 797 N = 797 N = 797
Month 3 70.02 4.97 14.09
(1.04) (0.18) (0.57)
N = 780 N = 780 N = 780
Month 4 81.72 4.61 17.71
(0.26) (0.19) (0.72)
N = 766 N = 766 N = 766
Month 5 81.87 4.43 18.50
(0.25) (0.18) (0.78)
N = 701 N = 701 N = 701
Month 6 81.88 4.32 18.94
(0.28) (0.19) (0.82)
N = 639 N = 639 N = 639
Months 1 to 6 83.00 4.85 17.13
(0.40) (0.14) (0.52)
N = 912 N = 912 N = 912
Year 1 71.02 4.69 15.15
0.50 0.38 1.24
N = 145 N = 145 N = 145
The “Average price” in period t is the average fee across people enrolled in period t. The “Average attendance” in period t is the average number of visits
across people enrolled in period t. The measure in Column (3) is the ratio of the measure in Column (1) and the measure in Column (2).
Table 3: Price per Average Attendance at Enrollment
Sample: First spell and no subsidy, all clubs
Users initially enrolled with a monthly contract
Users initially enrolled with an annual contract, join 14 month before the end of sample period.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors for “Average price per average attendance” measure computed using the bivariate Delta method.
The number of observations is denoted by N. An enrollment spell starts whenever an individual enrolls (or re-enrolls) in the club and ends whenever the
individual quits or is censored. The sample “First spell” consists of the first enrollment spell. The sample “First spell and no subsidy” restricts the sample
“First spell” to those spells in which the average adjusted monthly fee is at least $70 if the spell starts with a monthly contract and at least $58 if the spell
starts with an annual contract. The sample for the t-th month includes spells that are ongoing, not frozen, and not miscoded at month t. For the 6-month
period, the sample includes spells that are ongoing, not frozen, and not miscoded in at least one month in the period. For the 1-year period in the annual
contract, the sample includes only spells that started at least 14 months before the end of the sample period, and that were not prematurely terminated
because of medical reasons or relocation. 
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Average  Price per Average  Price per
attendance attendance attendance attendance
per month per month
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Distribution of measures
10th percentile 0.33 7.59 0.23 6.05
20th percentile 1.00 10.17 0.86 8.67
25th percentile 1.50 11.39 1.23 10.65
Median 3.91 20.89 3.58 20.34
75th percentile 7.00 58.39 6.58 59.82
90th percentile 10.75 107.50 11.00 119.64
95th percentile 12.83 170.00 13.25 239.28
N = 912 N = 912 N = 145 N = 145
Month 2 Month 3 Month 4
Monthly contract 5.500 4.998 4.592
(0.0658) 0.069 0.070
N = 6380 N = 5783 N = 5390
Annual contract 5.797 5.583 5.151
(0.1865) 0.191 0.188
N = 874 N = 858 N = 839
Sample: First spell, all clubs
Average attendance during the  n-th month since enrollment
Table 5: Average Attendance in Monthly and Annual Contracts 
(Sorting)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The number of observations is denoted by N. An enrollment spell starts whenever an
individual enrolls (or re-enrolls) in the club and ends whenever the individual quits or is censored. The sample “First spell”
consists of the first enrollment spell. The spells in row “Monthly Contract” start with a monthly contract. The spells in row “Annual
Contract” start with an annual contract. The sample in month n includes spells that are ongoing, not frozen, and not miscoded.
Table 4: Distribution of Attendance and Price per Attendance at Enrollment
Notes: The number of observations is denoted by N. An enrollment spell starts whenever an individual enrolls (or re-enrolls) in the club and ends whenever the
individual quits or is censored. The sample “First spell” consists of the first enrollment spell. The sample “First spell and no subsidy” restricts thes a m p l e“ F i r s t
spell” to those spells in which the average adjusted monthly fee is at least $70 if the spell starts with a monthly contract and at least $58 if the spell starts with an
annual contract. The spells in column “First Contract Monthly, months 1-6” start with a monthly contract. The spells in column “First Contract Annual,y e a r1 ”s t a r t
with an annual contract. The variable "Price per attendance" is defined as the ratio of the average price over the average attendance over the firsy period (6
months for the monthly contract, one year for the annual contract).
(monthly fee >= $70) (annual fee >= $700)
Sample: First spell and no subsidy, all clubs
First contract monthly, Months 1-6 First contract annual, Year 1  39 
 
Controls: no controls controls controls + no controls controls + no controls controls +
 time dummies  time dummies  time dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dummy for enrollment 
with monthly contract 0.0318 0.0509 0.0514 0.1650 0.1803 0.2858 0.2943
(0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0218) (0.0321) (0.0317) (0.0508) (0.0502)
Average monthly attendance
in the first 13 active months
Attendance 0.0641 0.0656 0.2643 0.2742












in the first 13 active months)
Monthly*Attendance -0.0292 -0.0291 -0.1429 -0.1363










Female -0.0576 -0.0566 -0.0453 -0.0458
(0.0143) (0.0144) (0.0148) (0.0149)
Age 0.0202 0.0204 0.0270 0.0280
(0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0050) (0.0050)
Age square -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Corporate member 0.0911 0.0816 0.1105 0.1089
(0.0143) (0.0144) (0.0147) (0.0149)
Student member -0.1342 -0.1370 -0.1071 -0.0907
(0.0500) (0.0498) (0.0530) (0.0545)
Month and year of enrollment X X X
Baseline renewal probability
for monthly=0 0.3993 0.4033 0.4161
Baseline renewal probability
for monthly=0 and attendance=0 0.1598 0.1679 0.0497 0.0497
Number of observations N=4905 N=4905 N=4905 N=4905 N=4905 N=4905 N=4905
Dependent variable: Enrollment at 14th active month
Sample: First spell with non-missing controls, all clubs
Table 6: Probit of Renewal Decision I
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The number of observations is denoted by N. Entries in the Table represent the marginal coefficients of the probit in
response to an infinitesimal change in the continuous variables, and a discrete change for the dummy variables. An enrollment spell starts whenever an individual
enrolls (or re-enrolls) in the club and ends whenever the individual quits or is censored. The sample “First spell with non-missing controls” consistso ft h ef i r s t
enrollment spell for individuals for whom the demographic controls “age” and “female” are available. The sample is further restricted to individuals who join at least
14 active months before the end of the sample period. See the text for a definition of Enrollment at the 14th active month. The controls "Month and year of
enrollment" indicate that the probit contains 11 dummies for the month of enrollment and 4 dummies for year of enrollment.
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Sample:
Controls: No Controls + No Controls + No Controls + No Controls + No Controls + No Controls + No Controls +
Controls Time Controls Time Controls Time Controls Time Controls Time Controls Time Controls Time
Dummies Dummies Dummies Dummies Dummies Dummies Dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Dummy for enrollment 
with monthly contract 0.1545 0.1698 0.0543 0.0719 0.0376 0.0582 -0.0009 0.0262 -0.0016 0.0294 0.0527 0.0465 0.0812 0.0925
(0.0287) (0.0286) (0.0217) (0.0219) (0.0221) (0.0222) (0.0261) (0.0252) (0.0264) (0.0252) (0.0479) (0.0501) (0.0370) (0.0378)
Average attendance 0.0728 0.0736
in last 4 months (0.0062) (0.0063)
Monthly contract*
(Average attendance -0.0384 -0.0379
in last 4 months) (0.0065) (0.0066)
Female -0.0462 -0.0405 -0.0405 -0.0759 -0.0811 -0.0443 -0.0306
(0.0149) (0.0143) (0.0144) (0.0166) (0.0167) (0.0398) (0.0280)
Age 0.0256 0.0145 0.0164 0.0239 0.0265 0.0312 0.0253
(0.0050) (0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0115) (0.0083)
Age square -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0003
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Corporate member 0.1004 0.0747 0.0700 0.0713 0.0705 0.2071 0.0043
(0.0149) (0.0144) (0.0145) (0.0168) (0.0169) (0.0484) (0.0319)
Student member -0.1147 -0.1151 -0.0953 -0.0916 -0.0767 0.1527 -0.1616
(0.0525) (0.0503) (0.0516) (0.0591) (0.0604) (0.2722) (0.0669)
Month and year of enrollment X X X X X X X
Renewal probability
for monthly=0 0.3983 0.4162 0.3925 0.4077 0.2677 0.2853 0.2589 0.2730 0.4701 0.5426 0.4366 0.4373
Renewal probability for
monthly=0 & attend.=0 0.1823 0.1832




Table 7: Probit of Renewal Decision II. Robustness
First spell with non-missing controls, all clubs No subsidy I,         all 
clubs
No subsidy II,         all 
clubs
14th active month 14th active month
Enrollment at
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The number of observations is denoted by N. Entries in the Table represent the marginal coefficients of the probit in response to an infinitesimal change in the continuous variables,
and a discrete change for the dummy variables. An enrollment spell starts whenever an individual enrolls (or re-enrolls) in the club and ends whenever the individual quits or is censored. The sample “First spell with non-
missing controls” consists of the first enrollment spell for individuals for whom the demographic controls “age” and “female” are available. The sample is further restricted to individuals who join at least 14 active months
before the end of the sample period. The sample "No Subsidy I" is a restriction of the sample “First spell with non-missing controls” to individuals paying on average a per-month fee of at least $70. The sample "No
Subsidy I" is a restriction of the sample “First spell with non-missing controls” to individuals paying on average a per-month fee of at least $60. See the text for a definition of Enrollment after 13 active months. The controls
"Month and year of enrollment" indicate that the probit contains 11 dummies for the month of enrollment and 4 dummies for year of enrollment.
Dependent variable:
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Average price  Average  Average price Average price  Average  Average price
per month attendance per average per month attendance per average
per month attendance per month attendance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Months 1-6 83.00 4.85 17.13 50.44 4.87 10.36
(0.40) (0.14) (0.52) (0.25) (0.05) (0.12)
N = 912 N = 912 N = 912 N = 7079 N = 7079 N = 7079
Months 7-12 82.04 3.59 22.87 53.03 3.91 13.56
(0.24) (0.16) (1.05) (0.31) (0.07) (0.25)
N = 606 N = 606 N = 606 N = 3961 N = 3961 N = 3961
Months 13-18 81.47 3.93 20.74 53.03 4.39 12.07
(0.35) (0.23) (1.24) (0.41) (0.10) (0.29)
N = 339 N = 339 N = 339 N = 2192 N = 2192 N = 2192
Months 19-24 81.67 3.87 21.10 54.18 4.39 12.35
(0.37) (0.29) (1.61) (0.58) (0.13) (0.39)
N = 200 N = 200 N = 200 N = 1181 N = 1181 N = 1181
Year 1 71.02 4.69 15.15 47.57 4.48 10.62
(0.50) (0.38) (1.24) (0.75) (0.17) (0.44)
N = 145 N = 145 N = 145 N = 598 N = 598 N = 598
Year 2 73.78 6.85 10.77 50.09 6.59 7.60
(1.06) (1.00) (1.57) (1.81) (0.49) (0.60)
N = 36 N = 36 N = 36 N = 112 N = 112 N = 112
Table 8: Attendance and Price per Average Attendance Over Time
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors for “Average price per average attendance” measure computed using the bivariate Delta method. The
number of observations is denoted by N. An enrollment spell starts whenever an individual enrolls (or re-enrolls) in the club and ends whenever the individual
quits or is censored. The sample “First spell” consists of the first enrollment spell. The sample “First spell and no subsidy” restricts the sample “First spell” to
those spells in which the average adjusted monthly fee is at least $70 if the spell starts with a monthly contract and at least $58 if the spell starts with an
annual contract. 
For the 6-month periods, the sample includes spells that are ongoing, not frozen, and not miscoded in at least one month in the period. For year 1 in the
annual contract, the sample includes only spells that started at least 14 months before the end of the sample period, and that were not prematurely terminated
because of medical reasons or relocation. For year 2, the sample includes only spells that started with an annual contract at least 26 months before the end of
the sample period, and that lasted at least 25 months. The spells in row “First contract monthly” start with a monthly contract. The spells in row “First contract
annual” start with an annual contract. The “Average price” in period t is the average fee across people enrolled in period t. The “Average attendance” inp e r i o dt
is the average number of visits across people enrolled in period t. The measure in Column (3) is the ratio of the measure in Column (1) and the measure in
Column (2).
Users initially enrolled with an annual contract
Users initially enrolled with a monthly contract
Sample: First spell and no subsidy, all clubs Sample: First spell, all clubs  42 
 
 
  Table 9: Loss from choice of flat-rate contracts 
  Sample: First spell and no subsidy, first 
contract monthly, all clubs 
  Sample: First spell and no subsidy, first 
contract annual, all clubs 












 (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6) 
Loss from choice of flat-
rate contract in $ 
698.16 607.35 595.00   -61.65 220.17 230.01 
  (106.05)  (53.33)  (41.40)  (424.22)  (193.95)  (146.08) 
Total money spent per 
spell in $ 
1516.88 1309.07 1256.48  1832.34 1562.73 1445.00 
  (114.96)  (59.73)  (46.15)  (169.77)  (101.25)  (76.47) 
Percentage of loss over 
money spent 
47.87% 51.28% 51.83%   6.01% 28.45% 27.18% 
  (4.78)  (2.93)  (2.60)  (17.62)  (9.66)  (8.63) 
Number of observations N  N = 70  N = 238  N = 345    N = 15  N = 43  N = 68 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The number of observations is denoted by N. An enrollment spell starts whenever an individual enrolls (or re-
enrolls) in the club and ends whenever the individual quits or is censored. The sample “First spell” consists of the first enrollment spell. The sample 
“First spell and no subsidy” further restricts the sample “First spell” to those spells in which the average adjusted monthly fee is at least $70 if the spell 
starts with a monthly contract and at least $58 if the spell starts with an annual contract. The spells in Column “First contract monthly” start with a 
monthly contract. The spells in Column “First contract annual” start with an annual contract. The measure “Loss from choice of contract with flat fee 
in $” is the average saving in $ that a user who chose a contract would have attained if she had purchased a 10-visit pass for $100 and attended the 
same number of times. A negative value denotes that the user would have lost money by purchasing the pass. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 